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NOTES
EMPLOYEE BARGAINING POWER UNDER THE
NORRIS-LAGUARDIA ACT: THE INDEPENDENT
CONTRACTOR PROBLEM*
TiaE Norris-LaGuardia Act permits union monopoly of the labor market.'
Designed to insure effective collective bargaining, the statute extends antitrust
immunity only to unions organized and acting to promote the terms and con-
ditions of employment. 2 Implementing this limitation, courts have barred in-
dependent contractors from organizing themselves and collectively fixing the
*United States v. Fish Smokers Trade Council, Inc., Crim. No. 148-208, S.D.N.Y., Oct.
15, 1956 (subsequently restored to trial calendar).
1. 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-13 (1952). The act is designed to encourage
self-organization. Section 102, in describing the policy of the act, states: "It is necessary
that he [the worker] have full freedom of ... self-organization .... " 47 STAT. 70 (1932),
29 U.S.C. § 102 (1952). See Colorado-Wyoming Express Co. v. Denver Local 13, Int'l
Brotherhood of Teamsters, 35 F. Supp. 155 (D. Colo. 1940). Freedom of self-organization
gives unions power to obtain a monopoly in the labor market. See MACHLUP, THE POLi-
TIcAL ECONOiMY OF MONOPOLY 333-38 (1952) (hereinafter cited as MACHLUP) ; MASON,
ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION AND THE MONOPOLY PROBLEM 196-200 (1957) (hereinafter cited
as MASON); Cox, Labor and the Antitrust Laws-A Preliminary Analysis, 104 U. PA. L.
REv. 252, 254 (1955) ; Comment, 54 YALE L.J. 853 (1945). A union, however, is not a
monopoly in the same sense as a business operating in the product market. It does not sell,
but only negotiates for the sale of, labor. It is also limited in monopoly power by the
difficulty of maintaining cohesiveness in an organization composed of a large number of
individuals. Nevertheless, it still is a monopoly. MASON 200-03. See also MACHLUP 341-42
(failure to use the term "monopoly" in connection with labor unions is chiefly a matter of
sensitivity about words which have acquired unpleasant connotations).
2. Originally, the Sherman Act was frequently applied to labor. See Loewe v. Lawlor,
208 U.S. 274 (1908) ; United States v. Workingmen's Amalgamated Council, 54 Fed. 994
(C.C.E.D. La. 1893). And the Clayton Act did not materially improve labor's position in the
courts. See Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Ass'n, 274 U.S. 37 (1927) ;
Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921). The validity of these decisions
was often challeaged. Steffen, Labor Activities in Restraint of Trade: The Apex Case,
50 YALE L.J. 787, 825 (1941). See BERMAN, LABOR AND THE SHERMAN ACT (1930);
FRANKFURTER & GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNcTION 199-278 (1930); Boudin, The Sherman
Act and Labor Disputes, 39 COLUM. L. REv. 1283 (1939). The Norris-LaGuardia Act was
passed as a reaction to the courts' restriction of the rights granted to labor in the Clayton
Act. H.R. RFP. No. 669, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 2-5 (1932); United States v. Hutcheson,
312 U.S. 219, 236 (1941) ; Etter, Statutory Definitions of "Labor Dispute," 19 ORE. L.
REv. 201, 229-44 (1940). Whether antitrust laws should be applicable to unions in any
manner is still a matter of debate. Kelley & Cranfield, Should Labor Unions be Subject
to Antitrust Laws?, Mich. State B.J., Jan. 1957, p. 24.
Nevertheless, Norris-LaGuardia provides: "No court... shall have jurisdiction to issue
any restraining order or permanent injunction in a case involving or growing out of a labor
dispute." 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1952). "The term 'labor dispute' includes
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price at which they sell their product.3 The absence of an employer-employee
relationship has led to holdings that these activities concern terms and con-
ditions of sale rather than employment.4 Decisions have even cast doubt on the
legality of attempts by employee unions to organize competing independent
any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment . . . whether or not the
disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee." 47 STAT. 73 (1932),
29 U.S.C. § 113(c) (1952).
Section 113 not only prohibits injunctions but also exempts parties involved in a labor
dispute from other types of antitrust censure. Section 20 of the Clayton Act, making non-
enjoinable activities legal, has been held to embrace activities which fall within the Norris-
LaGuardia definition of a "labor dispute." United States v. Hutcheson, supra; Steffen,
Labor Actizities in Restraint of Trade: The Hutcheson Case, 36 IuL. L. REv. 1. (1942)
(criticizing this statutory importation).
Disputes have been found in various situations. Donnelly Garment Co. v. Dubinsky,
154 F.2d 38 (8th Cir. 1946) (organizational activities) ; Beun v. Fur Workers Union, 24
CCH Lab. Cas. 11 67795 (D.D.C. 1953) (organizational picketing of an employer before
he began to hire employees) ; New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U.S. 552
(1938) (picketing in protest of racial discrimination in hiring) ; United States v. Carrozzo,
37 F. Supp. 191 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd sub nuom. United States v. International Hod Carriers
Council, 313 U.S. 539 (1941) (attempt to curtail automation); Diamond Full Fashioned
Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 20 F. Supp. 467 (E.D. Pa. 1937) (peaceful picketing in protest of
sale of plant machinery) ; Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 71 F.2d 284 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 293 U.S. 595 (1934) (urging another union to engage in a sympathy strike) ;
Matson Nay. Co. v. Seafarers Union, 100 F. Supp. 730 (D. Md. 1951) (retaliatory picket-
ing) ; Houston & North Texas Motor Freight Lines v. Local 886, Int'l Brotherhood of
Teamsters, 24 F. Supp. 619 (W.D. Okla. 1938) (minority union strike against majority
union which had a contract with the employer) ; Yoerg Brewing Co. v. Brennan, 59 F. Supp.
625 (D. Minn. 1945) (strike to coerce employer to refuse recognition of rival union certi-
fied by NLRB) ; Meier & Pohlmann Furniture Co. v. Gibbons, 113 F. Supp. 409 (E.D. Mo.
1953), aff'd, 233 F.2d 296 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 879 (1956) (employee refusal
to handle goods of another firm) ; Alcoa S.S. Co. v. MoMahon, 81 F. Supp. 541. (S.D.N.Y.
1948), aff'd, 173 F.2d 567 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 821 (1949) (strike in violation
of contract terms) ; Hunt v. Crumboch, 325 U.S. 821 (1945) (union forbade members to
work for employer suspected of murdering union official, thereby forcing him out of busi-
ness). But see, in contrast to Yoerg Brewing and Meier Furniture, Oberman & Co. v.
United Garment Workers, 21 F. Supp. 20 (W.D. Mo. 1937); Loews Inc. v. Basson, 46 F.
Supp. 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
3. See, e.g., Columbia River Packers Ass'n v. Hinton, 315 U.S. 143 (1942) ; Gulf Coast
Shrimpers and Oystermans Ass'n v. United States, 236 F.2d 658 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
352 U.S. 927 (1956); Hawaiian Tuna Packers v. International Longshoremen's Union, 72
F. Supp. 562 (D. Hawaii 1947). See also American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317
U.S. 519 (1943).
4. Although an employee-employer relationship is not required for the existence of a
labor dispute, the absence of such a relationship or of the possibility of such a relationship
precludes classification of the dispute as concerning terms or conditions of employment.
Columbia River Packers Ass'n v. Hinton, supra note 3, at 146-47. In Hawaiian Tuna
Packers v. International Longshoremen's Union, supra note 3, at 566, independent fisher-
men attempted to organize both themselves and a few crew members in one union. The
court rejected the contention that since the crew's wages depended on the selling price of
fish, disputes between the "union" and purchasers were "labor disputes" concerning con-
ditions of employment.
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contractors ;5 for combinations of "labor" and "non labor" groups which benefit
the latter interest are not relieved from Sherman Act stricture by the existence
of a labor dispute.6 Although the courts have retained considerable discretion
by manipulating the definition of independent contractor,7 interpretations of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act which restrict the ability of employee unions to organize
contractors have recently been criticized as unduly limiting union control of the
labor market.8
5. (Federal courts have never directly faced this problem. In the only case involving
an employee union organizing competing vendors, the Supreme Court found that the ven-
dors were, in economic reality, employees and therefore subject to unionization. Milk
Wagon Drivers' Union v. Lake Valley Farm Products, Inc., 311 U.S. 91 (1940), 26 IowA
L. REv. 411 (1941). The application of this decision to independent contractors, generally,
is doubtful. Compare Barnes, Unions and the Antitrust Laws, 7 LAB. L.J. 133, 175-76
(1956) (union organizing independent contractors probably not a labor dispute), with
Aetna Freight Lines, Inc. v. Clayton, 228 F.2d 384 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S.
950 (1956) (broad policy of the M111ilk Wagon case sustains the legality of employee picket-
ing to force independent contractor acceptance of union regulations on working conditions).
6. Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, Int'l Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 325 U.S.
797 (1945) (electrical workers local in combination with electrical fixture manufacturers
employing its members enjoined from forcing contractors to use only fixtures made by the
combined manufacturers) ; United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. United States, 330 U.S.
395 (1.947) (combination of employees and employers to prevent out-of-state manufacturers
from shipping and selling lumber in San Francisco held illegal) ; Philadelphia Record Co.
v. Manufacturing Photo Engravers Ass'n, 155 F.2d 799 (3d Cir. 1946) (combination of
union and employers' trade association forcing nonmember engravers to charge prices set
by the association enjoined) ; United States v. Milk Drivers Union, 6 CCH LAB. L. RnP.
fl 70934 (D. Minn. Aug. 30, 1957) (combination of union and dairy distributors, with union
acting as a policing agent to require retail stores to maintain noncompetitive consumer
prices, held illegal). See also Comment, 19 So. CALIF. L. Rzv. 256 (1946); 56 CoLuTm. L.
REv. 280 (1956).
A union, however, might be able to procure agreements from employers individually
without violation, even though the Sherman Act would probably be violated if it obtained
the same agreements from the employers collectively. East Texas Motor Freight Lines v.
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 163 F.2d 10 (5th Cir. 1947) ; Allen Bradley Co. v.
Local 3, Int'l Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, supra at 810-11 (dictum). Commentators
differ on whether such "individual" employer agreements should be permitted. See Barnes,
supra note 5, at 135 (opposed) ; Cox, supra note 1, at 270-71 (negotiating parallel agree-
ments effecting market control should not violate the Sherman Act).
7. E.g., Mitchell v. Gibbons, 172 F.2d 970 (8th Cir. 1949) (taxi drivers who leased
their cabs, worked anyxvhere within the lessor's franchise and made no accounting of their
fares to the lessor held lessor's employees and allowed to organize). See Hotel Stanley v.
Bright, 25 CCH Lab. Cas. 1 68420 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) (boycott by entertainers involved a
labor dispute where Entertainers Guild members desired recognition as employees) ; Brad-
dick v. Federation of Shorthand Reporters, 115 F. Supp. 550 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (motion for
summary judgment denied because status of shorthand reporters uncertain). Cf. NLRB
v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111 (1944) (manipulation under the Wagner Act).
8. See Aetna Freight Lines v. Clayton, 228 F.2d 384 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351
U.S. 950 (1956) (fact that union was trying to force its regulations on independent con-
tractors who did a similar type of work did not prevent § 113 of Norris-LaGuardia from
applying). For a more thorough, though not so recent criticism, see Gottesman, Restraint
of Trade-Employees or Enterprisers?, 15 U. Cal. L. Rav. 638 (1948).
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Attempting to meet this criticism, a federal district court has ruled that in-
dependent contractors may in some situations comprise a "labor" group and
therefore be permitted to combine with an organization of employees. In United
States v. Fish Smokers Trade Council, Inc.,9 the United States charged six
smokehouses, various independent jobbers and a union primarily composed of
smokehouse employees but including a few jobbers with a criminal violation of
the Sherman Act.' 0 The employees, driver-salesmen for the smokehouses,
claimed to be in direct competition with the jobbers who purchased from the
smokehouses for resale." The government contended that, even if the em-
ployees' claims were correct, organization of independent contractors by a union
violated the Sherman Act. While the jury's indecision precluded final disposition
of the action, the court's instructions rejected this contention and suggested a
test for determining the legality of such organization.12 The jury was charged
not to rely solely on the presence or absence of an employer-employee relation-
ship in classifying the independent contractors as a labor or non labor group.'
3
Rather, categorization was to depend on "whether the work done and the over-
all functions performed by the members of a group in an industry conflicts with
or competes with the interests of union members employed in the same indus-
try, and whether such work and functions bear a reasonable relationship to the
earnings, hours, working conditions and job security of employees."' 4
As a generalization removed from the context of Fish Smdkers, the "reason-
able relationship" test could yield undesirable results. Services performed and
prices charged by independent contractors at every level of distribution and
production in the industry affect the terms on which employees work.15 A self-
employed retailer's willingness to sell at competitive prices, for example, con-
flicts with the production employee's interest in high industry profits facilitating
demands for higher wages.' 6 But a "reasonable relationship" test which al-
9. Crim. No. 148-208, S.D.N.Y., Oct. 15, 1956 (subsequently restored to trial calendar).
See Transcript of Record, pp. 1454-63, (discussing government's contention that the Aetna
decision was not applicable because it contained certain elements of free speech).
10. Id. at pp. 1322-29 (government indictment).
11. See id. at pp. 1354-62, 1450-51.
12. The result of the original trial was a hung jury. Id. at pp. 1432-37. The case has
been restored to the trial calendar and is now pending.
13. "In this case you will be called upon to decide whether the jobbers in this industry
are a labor or a non labor group.... Whether a group is a labor or a non labor group is
not determined solely by whether or not an employee relationship exists with an employer."
Id. at pp. 1353-54.
14. Id. at p. 1354.
15. See SIDzE & BEAnuc WEBB, INDUSTRIAL DE-mOcRACY 654-71. (1902). A union
might want to organize all independent contractors in the industry. See LINDBLOM, UNIONS
AND CAPITALISM! 103 (1949) (teamsters claim jurisdiction over "everything on wheels").
16. The unions' demand for more wages at any cost has often been noted. See ATKINS
& LASswELL, LABOR ATTITUDES AND PROBLEMS 307 (1924) ("all we can get") ; BAKKE,
THE UNEMPLOYED WORKER 66 (1940) ("fair wages is more wages"); Slichter, Labor
After the War, in POSTWAR ECONOMIC PROBLEms 241, 254 (Harriss ed. 1943) (unions use
their bargaining power to their own advantage regardless of the interests of the nation).
1957]
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lowed a production union to organize retail outlets would undermine the Sher-
man Act without fostering the Norris-LaGuardia policies permitting a monop-
oly in the market where the employee sells his labor.' 7 The scope of the test
must accordingly be limited to contractors in functional competition with, and
directly substitutable for, union members.' 8 Under this approach, allowable
unionization would not be confined to contractors who performed services for
manufacturers employing union members. Entrepreneurs dealing with manu-
facturers who compete against employers might also be found functionally com-
petitive. 19 And while unionization of contractors who undertook substantial
See also LINDBLOM, UNIONS AND CAPITALISM 172-76 (1949) (when competitive system
makes union wages insecure, the union program calls for industry organization on a non-
competitive scale) ; e.g., Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, Int'l Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers, 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
Wage demands forcing a rise in prices may bring gains to workers in the industry con-
cerned, but do so at the expense of other workers whose real wages fall through the rise
in commodity prices. BEVERIDGE, FULL EMPLOYMENT IN A FREE SociETY 199 (1945). Fur-
thermore, wages increasing faster than productivity may lead to inflation. POOL, WAGE
POLICY IN RELATION TO INDUSTRIAL FLUCTUATIONS 73-85 (1938).
17. On the Sherman Act generally, see REPORT OF THE ATrORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL
COMMITFEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 1 (1955) (hereinafter cited as Arr'Y GEN.
REP.); HODGES, ANTITRUST ACT AND THE SUPREME COURT 4 (1941); WALKER, HISTORY
OF THE SHERMAN LAW 3 (1910). A labor market can extend beyond the dealings between
employee and employer. The independent contractor often sells his labor directly to the
purchaser of a commodity. Therefore, the physical market in which the independent con-
tractor deals may be both a labor and product market. On the other hand, the employee's
labor market does not extend beyond the functional limits of his occupation or those
occupations which compete with his. Thus, although the retailer may be selling in a labor
as well as a commodity market, he would not be operating in the same labor market as the
employee. See LESTER, EcoNomIcs OF LABOR 93-127 (1947) ; TAFT, ECONOMICS AND PROB-
LEMS OF LABOR 82-83 (2d ed. 1948) (labor market is a concept, not a single recognizable
institution).
18. This situation usually arises in the case of self-employed middlemen competing with
employees in the distribution of the employe-'s product, e.g., the Fish Smokers case, or
"employeeless" enterprises competing with employers of union members in retail sales. See
Note, 40 COLUM. L. REV. 1439, 1440-41 (1940).
The basis of the unions' demand to organize such independent contractors has long been
recognized. See Gottesman, supra note 8, at 651-57; Hearings Before the Joint Temporary
National Economic Committee, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., pt. 31-A, 18176-77 (1939) ; MASON
215; Note, 42 COLUM. L. Rmv. 702, 703 (1942). The economic problems faced by the em-
ployee are also faced by the independent contractors who perform the same type of work.
H.R. REP. No. 669, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 3, 6, 7 (1932) ; S. REP. No. 935, 72d Cong., 1st
Sess. 8-10 (1932). Accordingly, the union member, obliged to follow regulations on hours
and working conditions, occupies an underdog position when competing in the labor market
with independent contractors who are not so restricted. See 20 B.U.L. REV. 732, 735 (1940).
19. Prohibiting union regulation of competing independent contractors might induce
employers to substitute the contractor for the employee. If the jobbers cannot organize for
themselves, see note 3 supra, or be organized by an employees' union, see note 5 slnpra, the
employer gains the advantage of bargaining with an individual rather than the more power-
ful group representative. Employers have demonstrated their willingness to redesignate
employees as "independent contractors" in other contexts. See NLRB v. Blount, 131 F.2d
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functions beyond those discharged by employees might not be illegal, 20 em-
585 (8th Cir. 1942) (persons mining ore in return for a royalty held employees) ; Walling
v. Woodbine Coal Co., 64 F. Supp. 82 (E.D. Ky. 1945) (attempt by employers to avoid
Fair Labor Standards Act by contracting with each "employee" for the independent min-
ing of a certain portion of a coal mine) ; Wolfe, Determination of Employer-Employee
Relationships in Social Legislation, 41 COLUm. L. REv. 1015 (1941) (describing early at-
tempts to classify employees as independent contractors to avoid social security). The Taft-
Hartley Act makes employer substitution of independent contractors for employees an un-
fair labor practice when done to avoid the statutory obligation to bargain with the union.
See Labor Management Relations Act, § 8(a) (3), 49 STAT. 452 (1935), as amended, 29
U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1952). However, economic reasons for shifting from employees to
independent contractors, by demonstrating that the employer had a purpose other than avoid-
ance of his statutory obligation, constitute a defense to charges of violating § 8(a) (3).
NLRB v. Adkins Transfer Co., 226 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1955). The doctrine has been so
strained that a company can make a successful defense by pleading a "probable saving"
without showing any statistical support. See NLRB v. Houston Chronicle Publishing Co.,
211 F.2d 848 (5th Cir. 1954). Thus the burden of producing substantial evidence which
indicates that the change in business methods was motivated by an intention to avoid the
employer's bargaining obligations is on the union. Id. at 855; cf. New York State Labor
Relations Board v. National Beauty Parlors, Inc., 180 Misc. 997, 45 N.Y.S.2d 36 (Sup. Ct.
1943) (renting beauty shop booths to former employees was an unfair labor practice under
the state statute).
20. All independent contractors perform some additional functions. In certain situa-
tions, however, the basic work performed is essentially the same as that performed by the
employee. See Schwartz v. Laundry & Linen Supply Drivers' Union, 339 Pa. 353, 363, 14
A.2d 438, 445 (1940) (dissenting opinion), 89 U. PA. L. REv. 241. (1940) ; note 18 supra.
No cases have been found involving independent contractor-employee unions under the
Taft-Hartley Act, but the act is unlikely to pose any serious threat to legality. Such a
union would be recognized by the NLRB. See NLRB v. Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co., 169
F.2d 571, 576 (6th Cir. 1948) (fact that persons other than employees are members does
not prevent a labor organization which is otherwise qualified from continuing to function).
The union is considered, however, to be the representative only of the employees. General
Foods Corp., 110 N.L.R.B. 1088 (1954) (combined supervisors-employees union certified
by the board to represent employees only). On the union's power to bargain for the con-
tractors, see note 36 infra.
Since the Taft-Hartley Act refers solely to employees, see 49 STAT. 450 (1935), as
amended, 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1952), the independent contractor might not be protected
from unfair practices on the part of the employer or union. If the employer refused to deal
with him because of his union affiliation, the contractor could be without remedy. NLRB
v. Inter-City Advertising Co., 190 F.2d 420 (4th Cir. 1951) (Board cannot rectify the fir-
ing of supervisors because of their union activities). On the other hand, such action might
be considered a movement to discourage union membership generally in violation of § 8(1).
Cf. NLRB v. Vail Mfg. Co., 158 F.2d 664 (7th Cir. 1947) (discharge of foremen to in-
fluence voting against the union is illegal). The independent contractor, however, could
not be forced to join the union on pain of losing his source of livelihood as easily as could
the employee in a union shop. The Labor Management Relations Act, § 8(b), states: "It
shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents ... (4) to engage in,
or to induce or encourage the employees of any employer to engage in, a strike or a con-
certed refusal ... to use ... handle or work on any goods ... or to perform any services,
where an object thereof is: (A) forcing or requiring any employer or self-employed person
to join any labor or employer organization ...." 61. STAT. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)
(1952). But see Chauffeurs Union, 116 N.L.R.B. 955 (1956) (work stoppage by in-
19571
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ployee-independent contractor unions would be closely scrutinized to determine
if their activities caused anticompetitive effects in markets other than labor.21
Union regulation of the organized contractor's pricing policies could not be
considered an automatic indication of such anticompetitive effect.22 It has been
urged that a combined union may regulate the working conditions of its con-
tractor members, but that regulation of the prices they charge would violate
the Sherman Act.23 True, unions customarily control hours, wages and other
factors which affect the commodity price only indirectly; nevertheless, this
contention must fail.24 The primary aim of labor's legal monopoly is control of
wages.25 The prices independent contractors charge are determinative of the
dependent contractors to force unionization of other independents is not illegal under the
Taft-Hartley Act since contractors are not employees; presumably no antitrust suit had
been brought). Of course, other means, such as moral pressure and competing for the non-
union contractor's business would be legal, and, perhaps, effective. See Administrative De-
cision of NLRB General Counsel, No. 896, 2 CCH LAB. L. Rm,. ff 3850.65 (1954) (use of
the "silent" treatment on officers of a rival union is not unlawful).
For state court rulings on forcing independent contractors to join unions, see Riviello v.
Journeymen Barbers Union, 109 Cal. App. 2d 123, 240 P.2d 361 (1952) (peaceful picketing
for the purpose of compelling self-employed barber to become a restricted member of a
union without full rights is illegal) ; Simon v. Journeymen Barbers Union, 11 N.J. 448,
94 A.2d 840 (1953) (same); Note, 24 U. CH1. L. REv. 733, 735 (1957).
21. The past few years have revealed an increased vigilance on the part of the Depart-
ment of Justice in prosecuting unions for nonexempted restraints on trade. Barnes, Unions
and the Antitrust Laws, supra note 5, at 136.
22. Price fixing, if not within the express exemption of another statute, is a per se
violation of the Sherman Act. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150,
212-14, 218 (1940) (inquiry under the rule of reason ends when price fixing is involved) ;
United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 396-98 (1927) (reasonableness of
prices fixed is immaterial) ; A'rr'Y GEN. Rm. 12-13. This unconditional prohibition of price
fixing has been attacked by foreign jurists. MACHLUp 204. It is defended by reference to
the basic policy of the antitrust laws, which avoids government judgment on what prices
are fair and leaves the determination of price as far as possible to the autonomous forces
of the market. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., supra at 397-98; MACHLUP 204.
23. Schwartz v. Laundry & Linen Supply Drivers' Union, 339 Pa. 353, 14 A.2d 438
(1940), 20 B.U.L. REv. 732 (1940). See also Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469,
503-04 (1940) (dictum; union curtailment of price competition violates the Sherman Act).
24. Union control of the market price, although indirect, may be very effective. See
United States v. American Federation of Musicians, 47 F. Supp. 304 (N.D. Ill. 1942), aff'd
per curiam, 318 U.S. 741 (1943) (union activities against record manufacturers and broad-
casters designed to bar use of transcribed music in radio broadcasts is legal) ; MASON 198-99.
In addition to control of hours, wages and working conditions, unions have other ways of
manipulating the product market. See HENiG, THE BROTHERHOOD OF RAILWAY CLERKS
216-17 (1937) (use of union's political power for enactment of legislation favorable to em-
ployer and his product) ; LINDBLOM, UNIONS AND CAPITALISM 100 (1949) (use of union's
political power to gain high tariff rates for products which its members produce) ; Hoch-
man, Union Job Control, in UNIONS, MANAGEMENT, AND THE PUBLIC 328-29 (Bakke &
Kerr ed. 1948) (use of advertising to increase demand for a product). Union negotiations
for wage increases have been directly linked with the pricing policies of an industry. LIND-
*BLOM, UNIONS AND CAPITALISM 102 (1949).
25. See UNIONS, MANAGEMENT, AND THE PUBLIC 655 (Bakke & Kerr ed. 1948) (wages
are of the greatest concern to employees) ; BAKKE, THE UNEMPLOYED WoRKER 66 (1940)
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"wages" they receive, although elements of cost and entrepreneurial profit are
also reflected in contractor prices.2 6 Competing employees can only control
contractor "wages," and hence protect their own wage level, by regulating these
prices. 27 The very policies requiring Norris-LaGuardia protection for organi-
zation of employee-contractor unions necessitate granting such unions power to
control the wage element in contractor profits through control of prices.2 8 But
union price control should not be allowed to increase contractor profits more
than necessary to equate their "wages" with collectively bargained employee
wages. Entrepreneurs may not join together to benefit themselves,29 and even
if some benefit accrues to employees, Norris-LaGuardia policies do not protect
gains achieved through direct restraints on markets other than labor3
0
No restraint could arise from the organization of contractors, however, if the
market in which they sold remained essentially competitive. 31 The union would
then be able to influence contractor prices only through general power in the
(importance of wages for prestige as well as for purchasing power); HARiss, THE
AmmIcAN EcoNomY 238 (1953) (hereinafter cited as HAamss) (the union may be an end
in itself to union officials, but rank and file members' interest is principally in more income).
But see Slichter, Wage Policies of Trade Unions, in UNIONS, MANAGEMENT, AND THE
PUBLIC 670 (Bakke & Kerr ed. 1948) (suggesting that generalizations on importance of
wages are dangerous since each union has its own wage policy).
26. Certain of these costs are also borne by employees. Equipment depreciation costs,
for example, are not solely a problem of independent contractors. Many employees, such
as workers in the building trades, have their own equipment. Note, 42 COLUM. L. REV.
702, 703 n.7 (1942).
27. See Note, 24 U. CHI. L. Rav. 733, 738 (1957). If employees are not protected from
the competition of independent contractors, they may have to accept lower wages or find
themselves without jobs. See note 19 supra.
28. On an intrastate level, union contracts often fix prices directly. The barbers and
cosmetics unions commonly follow the practice of setting employer prices. Leiserson, Re-
straints on Trade, in UxIoNs, MANAGEMENT, AND THE PUBLIc 212 (Bakke & Kerr ed.
1948). See Note, 24 U. CHI. L. Rav. 733, 737-38 (1957).
Recent bargaining objectives of the United Automobile Workers include demands not
only for higher wages but also for a reduction in the automobile manufacturer's prices.
N.Y. Times, Aug. 23, 1957, § 1, p. 1, col. 4, p. 6, col. 2 (reply by General Motors Corpora-
tion to the United Auto Workers on a request to cut auto prices $100).
29. See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
30. See notes 44 infra, and 6, 17 supra.
31. Organization of the independent contractors would have a tendency to lessen the
number of sellers in the product market by combining all the contractors into what basical-
ly would be a single unit. If after organization, so many buyers and sellers of the product
existed that no one buyer or seller could have any appreciable influence on the price by
varying the amount which he offered to buy or sell, the market could be described as
competitive. See EDWARDS, MAINTAINING COMPETITION, REQUISITES OF A GOvERNMENT
POLIcY 6-9 (1949); HARluss 486; MACHLUP 13-15. See also REYNOLDS, THE CONTROL
OF COMPETITION IN CANADA 94-106 (1940) (examining the definition of cutthroat com-
petition). Although purely competitive markets exist primarily in theory, markets often
structurally approximate pure competition and behave in an essentially competitive fashion.
See Clark, Toward a Concept of Workable Competition, in READINGS IN THE SociAL
CONTROL OF INDUSTRY 452-58 (Am. Econ. Ass'n ed. 1942) ; HARRuss 486-87; MACHLUP 13.
Organization of all the contractors could destroy competition, however, by creating one
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labor market ;32 it could not effect excess profits on the contractor's non-em-
ployee functions, sold in a market over which it has no control.3 3 Attempts to
raise prices beyond levels necessary to the protection of employee wages would
result in the contractor charging prices higher than his employee-hiring com-
petitors and hence in his elimination.3 4 Moreover, unless the union could force
seller powerful enough to coerce the others. Whether a union would act in this manner is
uncertain. Compare note 16 supra, with note 47 infra.
Some economists have insisted that powerful unions destroy the competitive price system
by appropriating excess profits and hindering proper allocation of resources. See LID-
BLOM, UNIONS AND CAPITALISM 5 (1949) (unions will destroy the price system) ; MACH-
Ltp 401 ("sabotages" the functioning of the system) ; Simons, Some Reflections on Syn-
dicalimn, 52 J. POL. EcoN. 1 (1944) (prevent expansion of output). These views are
virtually without factual support. MASON 204. Furthermore, even these economists admit
that unions may be necessary for worker protection despite their effect on the competitive
market. LINDBLOM, UNIONS AND CAPITALISM 9-15, 19 (1949); MACHLUP 345-79.
32. With union control limited to the labor market, the combined union's activities in
the product market would be no more anticompetitive than in the fully organized labor
market where industry-wide bargaining prevails. At most, the union's control over product
price competition is limited to equalizing labor costs among all sellers. Cox, Labor and the
Antitrust Laws-A Preliminary Analysis, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 252, 277-78 (1955) (indus-
try-wide unionization diminishes but cannot eliminate labor cost as a competitive factor;
both differences in productivity and varying use of labor-saving machinery prevent complete
equalization of labor costs). Despite this tendency, industry-wide bargaining is still gen-
erally accepted. Id. at 275-79 (industry-wide bargaining may lead to inflation, but it does
not eliminate competition); LESTER & RoBIE, WAGES UNDER NATIONAL AND REGIONAL
COLLECTIvE BARGAINING 93-95 (1946) (wage decisions more sensible and farsighted with
industry-wide bargaining) ; H.R. REP. No. 510, f0th Cong., 1st Sess. 36, 59 (1947) (re-
jection of proposed legislation to outlaw industry-wide bargaining). But see Van Sickle,
Industry-Wide Collective Bargaining and the Public Interest, in UNIONS, MANAGENMENT,
AND THE PUBLIC 521, 526 (Bakke & Kerr ed. 1948) (industry-wide bargaining fosters
political and economic isolation, domestic regimentation and international conflict).
Furthermore, diminishing the variance between labor costs in a competitive industry
does not limit the type of competition which antitrust policy is designed to preserve. As
long as free entry into the market remains, price fixing, output limitations and customer
allocation leading to excess profits and lazy management-the basic evils at which antitrust
policy is aimed-cannot be utilized. Cox, supra at 279.
33. In a competitive market, price is set by supply and demand; the seller has no con-
trol. HARuuss 487; SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 440 (3d ed. 1955) ; CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY
OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 16-21 (7th ed. 1956). His only method of achieving profit
maximization is to adjust his output. Id. at 18; HARRISs 487; Note, 66 YALE L.J. 243, 253
n.48 (1956).
34. If a seller raises his price above that set by the competitive market, he will lose
his buyers. HAmuss 488; MACHLUP 14; see also STOCKING & WATKINS, MONOPOLY AND
FREE ENTERPRISE 9 (1951) (hereinafter cited as STOCKING & WATKINS). If the contractor
has a cost advantage in dealing with some customers, however, he can raise his price without
losing these customers to employer competitors. But unless the contractor raises his price
only to these buyers, he will lose his business in the area where he has no advantage over the
employer. Contractor price rises greater than cost advantage will, of course, result in com-
plete loss of the market. Such differences in efficiency are often.the reason for a structure
containing both contractors and employees. Thus, in the Fish Smokers case, the independent
contractors were apparently more efficient in servicing small firms and the smokehouse
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employers to accept a fixed ratio of employees to contractors, 35 it would not be
able to achieve excess profits for contractors by forcing down the prices at
which they buy.36 The employer would merely substitute employees for con-
tractors to protect his own profit margins.3 7 And a fixed ratio designed to save
employees more efficient in deliveries to chain stores and restaurants. See Transcript of
Record, p. 1333, United States v. Fish Smokers Trade Council, Inc., Crim. No. 148-208,
S.D.N.Y., Oct. 15, 1956 (subsequently restored to trial calendar).
35. Such a measure would be a proper subject of collective bargaining. The Taft-
Hartley Act allows unions of employees to bargain collectively with the employer on the
amount of dealings he will have with independent contractors when the employees are
capable of performing the same type of work as the contractors. Timken Roller Bearing
Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 500 (1946). State courts have .permitted employee unions to force agree-
ments by employers to conduct their businesses solely through the use of employees. Davis
v. Yates, 32 N.E.2d 86 (Ind. 1941) ; Ellingsen v. Milk Wagon Drivers' Union, 377 Ii. 76,
35 N.E.2d 349 (1941) (dictum). It has been urged that such an agreement should present
no serious antitrust problems. See Note, 42 CoLum. L. REv. 702, 703 (1942). But see United
States v. Milk Drivers Union, 6 CCH LAB. L. REP. ff 70934 (D. Minn. Aug. 30, 1957)
(contract clause requiring employers to forego sales to any independent contractors enter-
ing business after two years from the contract date is a violation of the Sherman Act). See
text at note 38 infra.
36. Whether under the Taft-Hartley Act the union could successfully compel the em-
ployer to bargain over the terms on which he sold supplies to the independent contractors
is unclear. Although no rulings have been made on this particular point, various lines of
reasoning have been suggested in cases in which unions containing employees have bar-
gained over the terms of employer contracts with nonemployee union members. The em-
ployer is required to bargain collectively in matters concerning wages, hours and working
conditions of employees. 49 STAT. 453 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1952). Ex-
ceptional as well as routine matters affecting the terms of employment are subjects of
compulsory bargaining. Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc.,
321 U.S. 342 (1943). The broad scope given to "exceptional matters" indicates employee
relations with nonemployees could be included. Timken Roller Bearing Co., supra note 35
(union control of amount of employer's dealings with independent contractors) ; cf. NLRB
v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 167 F.2d 983 (7th Cir. 1948) (insurance salesmen could use
concerted activity to communicate their views to their employer concerning appointment
of a cashier). The union can argue that its control of prices charged to independent con-
tractors is necessary for employees' aid and protection. See NLRB v. Retail Clerks Int'l
Ass'n, 21.1 F.2d 759, 765 (9th Cir. 1954) (dissenting opinion; union cannot force employer
to bargain for supervisors but can, in the interest of employees, make good faith demands
affecting the supervisors). See also NLRB v. Reynolds Int'l Pen Co., 162 F.2d 680 (7th
Cir. 1947) (employees who left work because of personal dissatisfaction with a foreman
were not protected by the Taft-Hartley Act; basis for dispute must be mutual aid of em-
ployees, not dislike of nonemployee). Of course, employees can always achieve their aims
by bargaining for their own wages in terms relating to the profits of the independent con-
tractors. Furthermore, although not required to bargain with a group representing non-
employees, the employer may voluntarily do so. NLRB v. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, 203
F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1953) (dictum).
37. In a substantially competitive market, the producer is forced to use the most efficient
means of production since the commodity price will approximate average cost of production
plus a normal return on investment. HAmiss 495. If the employer can make sales at a
lesser cost through employees than through independent contractors, he will shift to the
more efficient means. See note 19 supra.
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contractors from a shift to employees would violate the rule against self-organi-
zation by the contractors since they would be the sole beneficiaries of the plan.38
When organization results in oligopoly among sellers of the contractor's
product, however, union control of prices may give rise to antitrust violations.39
While union announcements of higher contractor prices can have no effect in a
competitive market, they may, in a market containing few sellers, bring about
general industry price fixing.40 Such a situation would present difficult alter-
natives. Courts could consider that the monopoly dangers inherent in the struc-
ture are too great to justify protection of Norris-LaGuardia policies. 41 But
38. Given a combined union, the desirability of a similar provision designed to aid
employees is questionable. It would protect employees who are in an inferior position be-
cause of their own inefficiency rather than the substandard working conditions of inde-
pendent contractors. In any event, a fixed ratio for the benefit of employees would pre-
sumably be legal under the Taft-Hartley Act. See note 35 supra.
39. 'An oligopoly exists when there are so few sellers in an industry that each realizes
that his own output and price decisions affect his competitors, and that their individual
decisions affect him. HARRISS 509; MASON 348; FELLNER, Co MPTIoN AmONG THE FEW
41-50 (1949).
40. For an oligopoly to exercise full profit maximization in monopolistic fashion, the
firms involved must act as a single group. HAmIss 510. Collusion is not essential. ATr'Y
GEN. REP. 36 (action by conscious parallelism); FELLNER, CoMPErITION AmONG THE FEW
33-34 (1949) (action through quasi-agreement); MASON 348 (achieving result of joint
action without collusion). Prior announcement of price and output changes may provide
the means for tacit agreement. See, e.g., the "trade information" cases: American Column
and Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 410 (1921) (exchange of daily sales re-
ports, monthly production reports and price lists was evidence of tacit agreement to fix
prices) ; United States r. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371 (1,923) (same) ; Maple
Flooring Manufacturers Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563, 586 (1925) (neither the
character of the information circulated nor the use made of it indicated that its necessary
effect would be a restraint upon commerce) ; Cement Manufacturers Protective Ass'n v.
United States, 268 U.S. 588, 603-04 (1925) (although defendants had the combined power
to fix prices, a careful analysis of their reaction to the circulated information showed that
they did not do so) ; Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553 (1936) (requir-
ing public announcement of all price changes and members' adherence to announced prices
limited price competition in violation of the Sherman Act). Absent advance knowledge of
competitors' reactions, firms are unlikely to change their prices to gain maximization of
industry profits; such price changes may be misinterpreted as being directed toward aggres-
sive competition and result in general price warfare. FELLNER, COMPETITION AMONG THE
FEw 177-80 (1949) ; Note, 66 YALE L.J. 1251, 1252 n.5 (1957).
41. This consideration would be in accordance with a possible interpretation of Ameri-
can Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946), and United States v. Aluminum
Co., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) (sitting as court of final judgment). See RosTow, A
NATIONAL POLICY FOR THE OIL INDUSTRY 136-37 (1948) (cases imply oligopoly to be
an illegal market structure); MACHLUP 224-25 (same); But see STOCKING & WATXINS
288-96, 304-13 (doubts validity of this interpretation although supporting it on policy
grounds). In Alcoa, the court rejected the notion that the e~xistence of unexerted monopoly
power in a single seller did not violate the Sherman Act. United States v. Aluminum Co.,
stpra at 428-30 (in effect overruling United States v. International Harvester Co., 274 U.S.
693, 708 (1927)). Similarly in American Tobacco, the Court ruled that a few sellers jointly
possessing power to raise industry prices or exclude competition violate the Sherman Act
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this conclusion discriminates against employees merely because their employers
were, even before contractor unionization, nearly oligopolistic. 42 Alternatively,
the courts could undertake difficult case by case analysis to determine if the
oligopoly behaves in a competitive or monopolistic fashion.4 3 In such analysis,
determination of Whether union price announcements tended to initiate indus-
try price changes would be especially relevant.44 Similarly, the level of profits
even though that power has never been exercised. American Tobacco Co. v. United States,
supra at 811-15.
Dissolution of oligopolies has been suggested. See STOCKING & WATKINS 180-83. Yet
another commentator has noted the absence of proof that twenty firms in an industry will
compete rnore effectively than four. See WESTON, THE ROLE OF MERGERS IN THE GROWTH OF
LARGE FIRsS 89-90 (1953). But see Bowman, Toward Less Monopoly, 101 U. PA. L. REv.
577, 634-35 (1953) (greater number of competitors more likely rather than less likely to
bring about competitive results) ; Note, 66 YAIE L.J. 1251, 1256 n.15 (1957) (agreement
effected more easily among a small group of competitors). In the present status of the
law, violation of the Sherman Act need not always require dissolution. Courts do not have
to change a market structure if they believe it can operate competitively when certain
practices are eliminated. See, e.g., United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 (1947)
(collusive restraints removed but no dissolution ordered; presumably because competition
had been effective in the industry's past).
42. If an oligopoly exists after unionization of the independent contractors, the market
before unionization probably consisted of a few large firms and many small firms-the
independent contractors-and was essentially oligopolistic. Since the big firms could force
out independent contractors merely by refusing to deal with them, the existence of the con-
tractors could not serve as a strenuous deterrent to the exercise of monopoly control by
the big firms. See Note, 66 YALE L.J. 1251, 1252 n.5 (1957).
43. Similar ad hoc factual analysis was used in the "trade information" cases,
note 40 supra. In each case, the Court analyzed such factors as position and control of
market, type of commodity sold in the market and the extent competition seemed to be
primarily based on price. Although various theoretical principles have been developed,
generalizations about oligopoly conduct are difficult, and particular attention must be paid
to the individual industry. MASON 60 (theory of oligopoly is a "ticket" to institutionalist
economics) ; Galbraith, Monopoly and Concentration of Economic Power, in A SURVEY OF
CONTE-PORARY Eco omlcs 99, 102 (Ellis ed. 1948) (generalization is impossible because
oligopoly, unlike competition, deals with individual behavior rather than mass behavior) ;
Bain, Market Classifications in Modern. Price Theory, 56 Q.J. EcoN. 561, 568 (too varied
to be treated systematically) ; see STOCKING & WATKINS 108 n.57 (antitrust policy can
only be applied on a case by case basis).
An oligopoly is unlikely to operate in a purely competitive fashion. It may, however,
behave in a fairly competitive manner. Such behavior has been termed workable com-
petition. MASON 353-54; Clark, Toward a Concept of Workable Competition, in READINGS
IN THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF INDUSTRY 452 (Am. Econ. Ass'n ed. 1942); ATr'y GEN. REP.
320-39 (criteria of workable competition). Commentators have suggested that courts are
moving toward accepting criteria of workable competition as standards for determining
whether unreasonable restraint of trade exists. See MASON 362; Stocking, On the Concept
of Workable Competition as an Antitrust Guide, 2 ANTITRUST BULL. 3 (1956). See also
United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 (1947). But see National Lead Co. v.
FTC, 227 F.2d 825, 834 (7th Cir. 1955), rev'd in part, 352 U.S. 419 (1957) (existence of
other forms of competition does not justify lack of price competition).
44. Assuming an equation of employee wages Wvith the contractor's profits, no "wage"
need would exist for independent contractors to raise their prices. Any price changes in-
1957]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
derived by independent contractors could be compared with wages earned by
employees performing comparable functions; any added capital or intangible
investment by the contractors would, of course, have to be consideredY4
Utilization of this approach would encourage employees to protect their wage
structure by organizing contractors but discourage them from using the organi-
zation to gain monopolistic power outside the labor market.40 In addition, the
knowledge that combined unions would be closely scrutinized might serve as
an incentive for the union to act as a "maverick" causing the oligopoly to be-
have competitively.
47
itiated by the contractors could only be evidence of an intent to use their new-found or-
ganizational power to benefit themselves through exercise of monopolistic control over the
market. This would frustrate the established rule against independent contractors organiz-
ing for their own benefit. See note 3 supra and accompanying text. Moreover, cooperation
of employers would be needed, for unless they followed the price rise, contractors would
have to retreat. And price changes by the employers could benefit the employees by en-
abling them to demand higher wages because of increased employer profits. But since
whatever benefits employees derived would be based on cooperation between union and em-
ployers in fixing prices, the basic policy of Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, Int'l Brotherhood
of Electrical Workers, 325 U.S. 797 (1945), would be violated. See note 6 supra. The
contractor would only be justified in raising his prices when increased wages forced the
employer to raise his prices. Even an increase in wages, however, may not result in an in-
crease in commodity prices. Under certain conditions, an employer might absorb increased
labor costs. 'MACHLUP 400 (listing four characteristics of industries in which this will
occur). In such a situation, the contractor would not be justified in raising his own prices.
Changes in price could easily be traced because they are usually not very frequent in
an oligopolistic market structure. MASON 348 (very infrequent) ; FELLNER, COMPETITION
AmONG THE Fw 180 (1949) (may produce a higher degree of price rigidity than would
exist under a monopoly) ; see note 40 supra. On the other hand, rapid fluctuation may
occur over a short period of time as a result of price warfare. Ibid. But during such a
period, competition would reign and the court need not be forced to consider the changes.
45. 'Profit has long been established as an excellent criterion for determining if work-
able competition exdsts. MACHLUP 490-97; MASON 368; Bain, The Profit Rate as A
Measure of Monopoly Power, 55 Q.J. EcoN. 271 (1941). Courts have acknowledged profits
as such an index. See American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 797, 806
(1946). But see United States v. Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d 416, 426-27 (2d Cir. 1945) ;
A rr'Y GEN. REP. 50 (suggesting that profits are primarily useful in leading to other cri-
teria).
Any capital invested by employees would, of course, be relevant to the comparison be-
tween contractor profits and wages. See note 26 supra.
46. This analysis would apply mutatis mutandis to oligopsony. See FELLNER, COM-
PETiON AMONG THE Frw 10-12 (1949) (similar approach may be used to analyze both
oligopoly and oligopsony). Combined unions posing oligopsony danger would occur, for
example, if drivers for a few large retail chains purchased fish from various smokehouses,
and unionized independent contractors also purchased fish from smokehouses for resale to
retail outlets.
47. The possibility of antitrust prosecution is a constant deterrent to illegal actions by
groups in the business world. Cf. Mason, The Effectiveness of the Federal Antitrust
Laws: A Symposium, 39 Am. EcoN. Rxv. 689, 713 (1949). When an industry knows that
it specifically is being observed, its behavior may be altered considerably. Tennant, The
Cigarette Industry, in THE STRucTuRE OF AMERICAN INDUsTRY 326, 347, 358 (Adams rev.
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Within these limitations, organization of contractors by employees seems
entirely consistent with the existing balance of policies between the Norris-La-
Guardia Act and the antitrust laws. Norris-LaGuardia sought to remove all
legal obstacles to employees increasing their bargaining power by joint asso-
ciation.48 Where a significant number of employees in good faith desire to
initiate organizational activity for their own benefit, they should be allowed to
organize all workers who-threaten the bargaining power granted them by the
act.49 The legal category of the workers-employee or independent contractor
-should not be determinative, for it has no bearing on the impact of such an
unorganized group on the bargaining power of the employees' ° The reason-
able relationship test advanced in Fish Smokers, restricted by the requirement
of functional competition, seems admirably suited to permitting desirable or-
ganization. However, antitrust policies require some limitations on the activ-
ities of combined unions once organized. Such limitations, coupled with con-
tinued scrutiny of these unions, would protect the consumer from monopolistic
practices not sanctioned by the Norris-LaGuardia Act for the protection of
the workingman.
ed. 1954) (firms in the cigarette industry have followed a cautious pricing policy since
they were convicted of violating the Sherman Act).
Furthermore, the necessity of maintaining morale and cohesiveness in a large organi-
zation limits the union's ability to act as a rational economic group and may decrease the
desire for monopoly profits when they imply public disrepute. See MASON 202; Bakke,
Why Workcrs Join Unions, in UNIONS, MANAGEIENT, AND THE PUBLIc 41 (Bakke &
Kerr ed. 1948) (social desires and self-respect as reasons for union membership) ; Golden
& Ruttenberg, Motives For Union M11embership, in id. at 49 (desire to be somebody as a
reason for union membership). Such factors might make "maverick" behavior more likely.
But see MACHLUP 398-99 (insisting that unions not only will not break up monopolies but
may seek to increase and consolidate an employer's monopolistic position).
Existence of a maverick firm which refused to join in quasi-agreement has in the past
been responsible for competitive oligopolies. HARRIss 510; STOCKING & WATIiNS 114-15.
For an example of maverick activity, see National Steel; A Pheimwienon, Fortune, June
1932, pp. 31, 36.
48. See note 1 sttpra.
49. A court could justifiably prevent a union of a few employees from organizing a
large group of contractors on the basis that such an organization would pose a greater
threat of antitrust violation than the protection of the few employees warranted. Cf. Local
309, Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470, 475-77 (1950) (significance
of the union's interest must be weighed against the value of the "self-employer" as a pre-
ventitive of excessive concentration of economic power).
Also, courts should inquire into who is organizing whom. The union must organize the
independent contractors for the employees' benefit, not merely because the independent
contractors desire to be organized. See note 3 supra and accompanying text. See also Note,
24 U. CHI. L. REv. 733, 738 (1957).
50. See notes 18, 19 supra.
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